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ABSTRACT
Multi-agent algorithms aim to find the best response in
strategic interactions. While many state-of-the-art algo-
rithms assume repeated interaction with a fixed set of oppo-
nents (or even self-play), a learner in the real world is more
likely to encounter the same strategic situation with chang-
ing counter-parties. This article presents a formal model of
such sequential interactions, and a corresponding algorithm
that combines the two established frameworks Pepper and
Bayesian policy reuse. For each interaction, the algorithm
faces a repeated stochastic game with an unknown (small)
number of repetitions against a random opponent from a
population, without observing the opponent’s identity. Our
algorithm is composed of two main steps: first it draws inspi-
ration from multiagent algorithms to obtain acting policies
in stochastic games, and second it computes a belief over the
possible opponents that is updated as the interaction occurs.
This allows the agent to quickly select the appropriate pol-
icy against the opponent. Our results show fast detection of
the opponent from its behavior, obtaining higher average re-
wards than the state-of-the-art baseline Pepper in repeated
stochastic games.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Learning to act in multiagent systems has received atten-
tion mainly from game theory and reinforcement learning
(RL). The former has proposed algorithms that converge
under different scenarios [14] and the latter has focused on
acting optimally in stochastic scenarios [12]. Interactions
among several agents are usually modelled as a normal-form
or stochastic game, and a wide variety of learning algorithms
targets this setting [7, 9, 13]. However, results are typically
based on the assumption of self-play (i.e., all participants
use the same algorithm) and a long period of repeated in-
teractions. In contrast, we focus on sequential interactions,
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i.e., the agent is paired with stochastically drawn opponents,
with whom the agent interacts in short periods while ob-
serving joint actions, but without observing the opponent’s
identity.
Recent works have proposed algorithms for learning in re-
peated stochastic games [17, 20], however, it is an open prob-
lem how to act quickly and optimally when facing different
opponents [20]. Recent work on Stochastic Bayesian Games
has compared several ways to incorporate observations into
beliefs over opponent types when those types are re-drawn
after every state transition [1]. In contrast, we assume that
opponents are redrawn for interactions over several repeated
stochastic games. The learning algorithm needs to optimally
reuse previously learned information from distinct but sim-
ilar interactions – a challenge that has been largely studied
by transfer learning (TL). TL has been applied mostly in
single-agent domains where information from learned source
tasks can be reused in a new target task [30]. Determining
how two tasks are similar, what information to be trans-
ferred and when it should be transferred are open problems
in TL. Related to TL there are different areas that also
share a connection with the problem of how to efficiently
reuse previously learned information, e.g., policy reuse [21],
ad-hoc coordination [4] and learning in non-stationary envi-
ronments [18].
We contribute to the state of the art in two ways: First, by
providing a more natural formal model of sequential inter-
actions and second with an algorithm for quick detection of
opponents in that setting. Our proposed algorithm Bayes-
Pepper builds on top of two previously successful frame-
works:
• Pepper [15], a learning algorithm for repeated stochas-
tic games, is used to obtain policies on how to act
against the possible opponents. Pepper uses the paradigm
of optimism under uncertainty together with a joint
action learner to learn a policy in stochastic games.
• Bayesian policy reuse (BPR) [29] is used as a fast
detection process to identify the opponent and select
the appropriate acting policy. While previously BPR
has been evaluated in single-agent tasks and repeated
normal-form games, this is the first time it is extended
to stochastic games.
Our setting assumes a population of opponents that can
be divided into different groups. First, Bayes-Pepper needs
to compute policies and models of the opponents, which we
assume happens at an offline phase. Second, in an online
phase a random process pairs the learning agent against one
opponent for a stochastic game. The learning agent has no
control over this process and does not observe the opponent
identity. When the game finishes the learning agent receives
an observation (reward) and updates the belief accordingly.
Subsequently, the agent is paired with a new opponent. A
formal definition of the game is given in Section 3.3.
This paper is presented as follows: Section 2 presents the
related work in transfer learning, policy reuse and learning in
non-stationary environments. Section 3 describe the formal
models of reinforcement learning and game theory. Section 4
presents the proposed Bayes-Pepper algorithm. Section 5
presents experimental results in repeated stochastic games.
Section 6 provides a discussion considering the results and
provides directions for future research. Finally, Section 7
summarizes the conclusions of this work.
2. RELATEDWORK
This article tackles the problem of finding a best response
when being repeatedly paired with unknown opponents from
an unknown population with known types. We propose
an algorithm that aims to identify opponents while best-
responding in face of residual uncertainty. Our setting and
approach shares similarities to transfer learning, policy reuse
and ad-hoc coordination which we review in this section.
Transfer learning was first used in machine learning to
transfer between learning tasks in a supervised learning sce-
nario. Recently, TL has gained attention in the RL com-
munity in particular in single-agent scenarios. An ideal
fully autonomous RL transfer agent needs to complete three
phases [30]:
• Given a target task, select an appropriate set of source
tasks from which to transfer.
• Learn how the source task(s) and target task are re-
lated.
• Transfer knowledge from the source task(s) to the tar-
get task.
There are different evaluation metrics for TL algorithms
(e.g., jumpstart, asymptotic performance, total rewards, among
others) and even when these three steps are usually con-
nected, TL has focused on them independently. For exam-
ple, for the transfer step different ideas have been evaluated,
e.g., models, instances and policies.
One approach that transfers instances from similar tasks
was proposed by Lazaric et al. [28]. They proposed a mea-
sure to identify which source tasks are more likely to have
samples similar to those in the target task, namely task
compliance. Moreover, to select which instances to transfer
from a task they propose the relevance measure. However,
the approach was proposed for single-agent domains with
continuous state and action spaces, and does not naturally
transfer to our setting. Closer to our approach, Boutsioukis
et al. [8] proposed TL by extending the Q-learning reuse
algorithm [31] to multiagent scenarios. In contrast to our
ambition of transfer from interactions against different op-
ponents, their goal is to transfer information learned from
a task with n agents to a different task with m 6= n agents.
In particular, they propose an inter-task transfer approach
(i.e., the state and action spaces are not the same in the
target and source tasks) and the evaluation was performed
on the predator-prey domain transferring information tasks
learned with different number of predators (agents). Policy
reuse techniques are another area with a similar spirit since
these approaches assume to start with a set of policies to use,
and the problem is to select among them when facing a new
task. Fernandez and Veloso [21] use policy reuse as a prob-
abilistic bias when learning of new, similar tasks in single
agent domains. Bayesian Policy Reuse (BPR) [29] assumes
prior knowledge of the performance of different policies over
different tasks. BPR computes a belief over the possible
tasks which is updated at every interaction and is used to
select the policy which maximises the expected reward given
the current belief. Bayesian reasoning has been used in RL
to learn when there is a group of related tasks with similar
structure. Lazaric and Ghavamzadeh [27] proposed an algo-
rithm assuming tasks have common state and action spaces
and their value functions are sampled from a common prior.
In contrast, our approach extends the BPR algorithm (see
Section 3.2) to identify opponents rather than tasks, and
combine it with a multiagent learning algorithm.
Ad-hoc coordination is another related problem where an
agent needs to coordinate with an unknown agent but when
a set of previous models is known. In this setting, Barrett et
al. [4] proposed the PLASTIC algorithm which learns how
to cooperate with other teammates based on a collection
of policies to select from, which is similar to our approach.
The algorithm selects at each interaction the most likely
teammate type and acts following the corresponding policy.
However, this approach do not consider changing agents over
the course of interactions as we do.
Learning in non-stationary environments is another re-
lated area since these approaches explicitly model changes
in the environment. Their goal is to learn an optimal pol-
icy and at the same time detect when the environment has
changed to a different one, updating the acting policy ac-
cordingly. One algorithm designed for single agent tasks
with a changing environment is the Reinforcement Learn-
ing with Context detection (RL-CD) [18]. RL-CD learns a
model of the specific task and assumes an environment that
changes infrequently among different contexts. To detect
a new context RL-CD computes a quality measure of the
learned models. Hernandez-Leal et al. [23, 25] addressed a
similar problem in two-player repeated normal-form games.
In this case, the opponent has different stationary strategies
to select from and the learning agent needs to learn online
how to act optimally against each strategy while detecting
when the opponent changes to a different one. Since the op-
ponent might reuse one previous strategy at a later stage of
the interaction the learning agent should keep previous mod-
els and policies in order to quickly detect them [24]. While
this might be the closest state of the art, these approaches
do not consider repeated stochastic games.
Experimental evidence suggests that people learn heuris-
tics which later are transferred across different games [5].
Based on these results there is another category of algo-
rithms that aims to learn in one game and generalize how
to act in a different game (known as general game playing).
Banerjee and Stone [3] proposed a transfer approach in two-
player, alternate move, complete information games facing
stationary opponents. The idea is to learn general features
that can be reused across games, for example, they learned
from played games on Tic-tac-toe and transferred informa-
tion to more complex game like Othello.
In contrast with previous approaches we focus on two-
player repeated stochastic games. An agent faces an op-
ponent whose identity is unknown to the agent and where
every few interactions a random process selects a new op-
ponent from the population (the agent does not know when
these changes happen).
3. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, first we review the formal model of rein-
forcement learning. Then, we describe the Bayesian policy
reuse framework [29]. Later, we present our sequential in-
teractions model in the context of and stochastic games.
Finally, we describe Pepper [15] which inspire our proposed
Bayes-Pepper algorithm.
3.1 Reinforcement learning
Reinforcement learning (RL) is one important area of ma-
chine learning that formalizes the interaction of an agent
with its environment using a Markov decision process (MDP).
An MDP is defined by the tuple 〈S,A,R, T 〉 where S repre-
sent the world divided up into a finite set of possible states.
A represents a finite set of available actions. The transition
function T : S × A → ∆(S) maps each state-action pair to
a probability distribution over the possible successor states,
where ∆(S) denotes the set of all probability distributions
over S. Thus, for each s, s′ ∈ S and a ∈ A, the function
T determines the probability of a transition from state s
to state s′ after executing action a. The reward function
R : S × A × S → R defines the immediate and possibly
stochastic reward that an agent would receive for being in
state s, executing action a and transitioning to state s′.
MDPs are adequate models to obtain optimal decisions
in single agent environments. Solving an MDP will yield
a policy pi : S → A, which is a mapping from states to
actions. An optimal policy pi∗ is the one that maximises the
expected reward. There are different techniques for solving
MDPs assuming a complete description of all its elements.
One of the most common techniques is the value iteration
algorithm [6] which is based on the Bellman equation:
V pi(s) =
∑
a∈A
pi(s, a)
∑
s′∈S
T (s, a, s′)[R(s, a, s′) + γV pi(s′)],
with γ ∈ [0, 1). This equation expresses the value of a
state which can be used to obtain the optimal policy pi∗ =
arg maxpi V
pi(s), i.e., the one that maximises that value func-
tion, and the optimal value function V ∗(s).
V ∗(s) = max
pi
V pi(s) ∀s ∈ S.
Value iteration requires complete and accurate represen-
tation of states, actions, rewards and transitions. However,
this may be difficult to obtain in many domains. For this
reason, RL algorithms learn from experience without having
a complete description of the MDP a priori. In contrast, an
RL agent interacts with the environment in discrete time-
steps. At each time, the agent chooses an action from the set
of actions available, which is subsequently executed in the
environment. The environment moves to a new state and
the reward associated with the transition is emitted. The
goal of a RL agent is to maximise the expected reward. In
this type of learning the learner is not told which actions to
take, but instead must discover which actions yield the best
reward by trial and error.
Q-learning [32] is one well known algorithm for RL. It has
been devised for stationary, single-agent, fully observable
environments with discrete actions. In its general form, a
Q-learning agent can be in any state s ∈ S and can choose
an action a ∈ A. It keeps a data structure Qˆ(s, a) that rep-
resents the estimate of its expected payoff starting in state
s, taking action a. Each entry Qˆ(s, a) is an estimate of the
corresponding optimal Q∗ function that maps state-action
pairs to the discounted sum of future rewards when start-
ing with the given action and following the optimal policy
thereafter. Each time the agent makes a transition from a
state s to a state s′ via action a receiving payoff r, the Q
table is updated as follows:
Qˆ(s, a) = Qˆ(s, a) + α[(r + γmax
b
Qˆ(s′, b))− Qˆ(s, a)]
with the learning rate α and the discount factor γ ∈ [0, 1]
being parameters of the algorithm, with α typically decreas-
ing over the course of many iterations. Q-learning is proved
to converge towards Q∗ if each state-action pair is visited
infinitely often under specific parameters [32].
3.2 Bayesian policy reuse
Bayesian policy reuse is a framework to quickly determine
the best policy to select when faced with an unknown task.
Formally, a task is defined as an MDP. A policy is a function
pi(s) that specifies an appropriate action a for each state s.
The return, or utility, generated from running the policy pi in
an interaction of a task instance is the accumulated reward,
Upi =
∑k
i=0 ri, with k being the length of the interaction
and ri being the reward received at step i.
Let an agent be equipped with a policy library Π for tasks
in a domain. The agent is presented with an unknown task
which must be solved within a limited and small number of
trials. At the beginning of each trial episode, the agent can
select one policy from pi ∈ Π to execute. The goal of the
agent is thus to select policies to minimize the total regret
incurred in the limited task duration with respect to the
performance of the best alternative from Π in hindsight.
BPR assumes knowledge of performance models describ-
ing how policies behave on different tasks. A performance
model, P (U |τ, pi), is a probability distribution over the util-
ity using pi on a task τ . A signal σ is any information that
is correlated with the performance of a policy and that is
provided to the agent in an online execution of the policy on
a task (e.g., immediate rewards). For a set of tasks T and
a new instance τ? the belief β is a probability distribution
over T that measures to what extent τ? matches the known
tasks in their observation signals σ. The belief is initialized
with a prior probability. After each execution on the un-
known task the environment provides an observation signal
to the agent, which is used to update beliefs according to
Bayes’ rule:
βk(τ) =
Pr(σk|τ, pik)βk−1(τ)∑
τ ′∈T Pr(σ
k|τ ′, pik)βk−1(τ ′). (1)
Different mechanisms can be used to select a policy to ex-
ecute. An always greedy policy selection mechanism would
fail to explore, resulting in not reaching the global maxi-
mum. On the other hand a totally exploratory policy selec-
tion mechanism would not make an effort to improve perfor-
mance. We thus require a balance, for which different policy
selection heuristics have been proposed [29]. A policy selec-
tion heuristic V is a function that estimates a value for each
policy through the extent to which it balances exploration
with a limited degree of look-ahead for exploitation.
The probability of improvement heuristic for policy selec-
tion [29] considers the probability with which a specific pol-
icy can achieve a hypothesized increase in performance over
the current best estimate. Assume that U+ ∈ R is some util-
ity which is larger than the best estimate under the current
belief,
Uˆ = max
pi∈Π
∑
τ∈T
β(τ)E[U |τ, pi].
The heuristic thus chooses the policy
arg max
pi∈Π
∑
τ∈T
β(τ) Pr(U+|τ, pi),
where U+ > Uˆ .
3.3 Games
In contrast to classical RL, which considers one single
agent in a stationary environment, Game theory studies
rational decision making when several agents interact [22].
The core concept of a Game captures the strategic conflict
of interest in a mathematical model. Note that different
areas provide different terminology. Therefore, we will use
the terms player and agent interchangeably; similarly for re-
ward and payoff. Finally, we will refer to other agents in
the environment as opponents irrespective of the domain’s
or agent’s cooperative or adversarial nature.
A stochastic game with two players i and −i consists of a
set of stage games S (also known as states). In each stage
s players choose an action from the set a ∈ A(s). A game
begins in a state sb ∈ S. A joint action a = (ai, a−i) is
played at stage s and player i receives an immediate reward
ri(s,a), the world transitions into a new stage s
′ according
to the transition model T (s, s′,a). When a goal state sg ∈ S
is encountered the game finishes, the accumulated reward
during the game is called an episodic reward.
We formalize Sequential Interactions (SI) as a specific
variation of repeated stochastic games, where at each episode
k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} a process draws a set of players Pk ⊂ I
from the population of individuals I to play a finite stochas-
tic game that yields a reward (accumulated over the game)
to each player. After the stochastic game terminates, the
subsequent interaction commences. We specifically discuss
the setting where the selection process is stochastic (as op-
posed to being a strategic choice by the agents), and the
population comprises an unknown distribution over types
of strategies. While in the general case these types may
be unknown, our new algorithm assumes access to a priori
interactions with each (proto-) type. We consider Pk and
opponent rewards within the stochastic game to be unob-
servable, while the joint actions are observable.
3.4 Pepper
Pepper [15] (potential exploration with pseudo station-
ary restarts) was proposed as a framework to extend algo-
rithms for learning in repeated normal-form games to re-
peated stochastic games. Pepper assumes it can observe its
own immediate reward but not the opponents’, and also as-
sumes the maximum possible reward Rmax known for each
episode. It uses the principle of optimism in face of uncer-
tainty [10] and combines it with a learning algorithm. Pep-
per computes the expected future rewards for a joint action
a being in state s as:
R(s,a) = r(s,a) +
∑
s′∈S
T (s, s′,a)V (s′) (2)
where V (s′) is the expected future rewards of being in state
s′. Note that given r(·), T (·) and V (·), value iteration can
be used to compute Equation 2, and r and T can be learned
from observations. Moreover, Pepper is initialized under the
assumption that all states result in maximal reward. How-
ever, there is still the problem of updating V (s′) throughout
the interaction. Pepper proposes a mechanism for estimat-
ing future rewards combining off-policy (e.g., Q-learning)
and on-policy methods for estimating V (s), i.e., an on-policy
estimation based on the observed distribution of joint ac-
tions, using n(s), n(s,a) for the number of visits to state s
and the number of times joint action a was chosen in that
state respectively:
V on(s) =
∑
a∈A(s)
n(s,a)
n(s)
R(s,a)
and a combined estimation
V (s) = λ(s)Vˆ (s) + (1− λ(s))V on(s).
Where Vˆ (s) represents an optimistic approximation given
by
Vˆ (s) = max(V off(s), V on(s))
and where λ ∈ [0, 1] represents a stationarity measure ini-
tialized to one but approaching zero when the agent gets
more experience.1 Pepper uses the concept of non-pseudo
stationary restarts, i.e., when R(s) is observed to not be
pseudo stationary λ(s) resets to one. Let n′(s) be the num-
ber of visits to stage s since R(s) was last observed to not
be pseudo-stationary, then:
λ(s) = max
(
0,
C − n′(s)
C
)
with C ∈ N+.
The Pepper framework is described in Algorithm 1 where
different policy selection approaches can be plugged to com-
pute pi. For example, using
max
a
R(s,a)
seems suitable for a friendly opponent, while
max
ai
min
a−i
R(s,a)
is a minimax approach that suits other types of opponents.
Next, we present our Bayes-Pepper approach which uses
Pepper in an offline phase to obtain policies. During the
online phase it computes a belief over the possible opponents
to tackle the uncertainty over the opponent’s identity in a
sequential interaction.
4. BAYES-PEPPER
Bayes-Pepper is composed mainly of two phases which are
depicted in Figure 1.
1Recall that R(s, a) is initialized to Rmax so it is likely to de-
crease in early episodes, but eventually will become pseudo-
stationary.
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Figure 1: Bayes-Pepper algorithm: (a) in an offline phase, Pepper is used to generate policies against each
opponent and (b) performance models and transition models are generated from the learned policies. (c) In
the online phase (i.e., sequential interactions) we assume a population of agents and a random process that
matches the Bayes-Pepper agent and one opponent. Bayes-Pepper selects a policy pi to act, in a stochastic
game (SG) the agent computes an intra-belief which might override the selected policy; when the game
finishes Bayes-Pepper receives an observation σ that is used to update its belief.
Algorithm 1: Pepper algorithmic framework
Input: States S, maximum possible reward Rmax
1 Initialize V (·) with Rmax
2 Random initial policy pi
3 for each episode of the stochastic game do
4 Update R(·);Eq.2
5 Update policy pi
6 Observe state
7 while state is not goal do
8 Select action a
9 Observe state
10 Receive observation r
11 if enough visits to (s,a) then
12 Update rewards, V (·), transitions
13 Update R(·);Eq.2
14 Update policy pi
• An offline phase where Bayes-Pepper generates policies
and performance models. Here, the agent observes the
opponent’s identity.
• An online phase where a belief based approach is used
to detect the opponent’s identity and act with the cor-
responding policy. Here, the agent observes states and
actions at every step of the game but only observes the
accumulated reward when a stochastic game finishes.
The belief is updated at every stochastic game (see
Section 4.2) and at every stage in a stochastic game
(see Section 4.3).
Next, we describe these two phases in more detail.
4.1 Policy and models generation
Bayes-Pepper needs to generate policies and models for
each opponent. Bayes-Pepper assumes an offline learning
phase (see Algorithm 2) in which Pepper algorithm is used
to obtain a policy for every opponent (lines 3–5). Then, per-
formance models are obtained by generating list of rewards
for each opponent and policy and fitting the generated data
into a distribution (in our experiments we used Gaussian
Algorithm 2: Bayes-Pepper models and policy genera-
tion
1 Π = ∅
2 for every opponent τ ∈ T do
3 Opponent τ is announced
4 Bayes-Pepper learns a policy pinew facing τ
5 Π = Π ∪ pinew
6 for every opponent τ ∈ T do
7 for every pi ∈ Π do
8 Get list of rewards r and [s,a] pairs using pi
against τ
9 Fit r to a distribution to obtain Pr(U |τ, pi)
10 Fit [s,a] to a distribution to obtain Pr(M |τ, pi)
distribution). The generated set of performance models can
be seen as a matrix of probability distributions, see Fig-
ure 1 (b). Similarly, a list of state-action pairs is generated
and fitted to a multinomial distribution to generate a tran-
sition model (lines 6–10), used in the intra-game belief, see
Figure 1 (c).
4.2 Opponent detection based on rewards
Once Bayes-Pepper has a set of policies Π and its asso-
ciated models it can act in an online mode. The steps of
Bayes-Pepper online detection phase are described in Algo-
rithm 3. Bayes-Pepper starts with a set of policies Π, prior
probabilities over the opponents Pr(T ), performance mod-
els Pr(U |T ,Π) and transition models Pr(M |T ,Π). Bayes-
Pepper initializes the belief over tasks with the prior proba-
bilities Pr(T ) (line 1). Then, for each episode of the sequen-
tial interaction a loop performs the following steps:
• select a policy to execute (according to the belief β and
exploration heuristic V) (lines 3–4),
• use the selected policy on the stochastic game (line 5),
• receive an observation signal σ, this is, the accumu-
lated reward of the played game (line 6),
Algorithm 3: Bayes-Pepper detection algorithm
Input: Policy library Π, prior probabilities Pr(T ),
performance models Pr(U |T ,Π), transition
models Pr(M |T ,Π), episodes K, exploration
heuristic V
1 Initialize beliefs β0(T ) = Pr(T )
2 for episodes k = 1, . . . ,K do
3 Compute vpi = V(pi, βk−1) for all pi ∈ Π
4 pik = argmaxpi∈Πvpi
5 Start game with policy pik and use intra-game belief
(ζ) together with Pr(M |T ,Π) (see Section 4.3)
6 Obtain observation signal σk (e.g., episodic reward)
7 Update belief βk(τ) = Pr(σ
k|τ,pik)βk−1(τ)∑
τ′∈T Pr(σk|τ ′,pik)βk−1(τ ′)
• update the belief with the observation using Eq. 1
(line 7).
Since we assume that only the accumulated reward for the
game is observed when the game finishes, a basic approach
is to select a policy to play for the entire stochastic game.
However, this might result in suboptimal results for example
when the opponent changes in the next interaction (as ex-
perimentally shown in Section 5.3). To overcome this issue,
we propose to update the belief during a stochastic game
using the state-action pairs (which are always observable).
This information is also a signal of the opponent behavior
and the process is similar to the one described previously.
4.3 Intra-game belief detection
Let ζ`(τ) be the intra-game belief which is initialized with
the belief β(τ). The intra-game belief is updated in a similar
way using Eq. 1 with two minor differences, the observation
σ is the observed frequency over state-action pairs (or states)
and the transition models P (M |T ,Π) are used to obtain the
likelihood of a given observation.
Since the observed frequency might change more in early
stages of the game we consider weighted approach, initially
giving more weight to β and with each experience giving
more weight to ζ as follows:
ζ`(τ) = wβ(τ) + (1− w)ζ`−1(τ) (3)
with w = 1 initially and w = w · ηt, with η = [0, 1) and
t the number of experienced steps in the current stochastic
game. Computing this updated belief might override the
policy that was selected initially which is useful to avoid
using a suboptimal policy for a complete stochastic game.
5. EXPERIMENTS
In this section we present results on a stochastic game
represented as a grid world. We performed experiments
comparing our approach Bayes-Pepper with Pepper [15] and
an Omniscient agent that knows the opponent’s identities
and plays optimal policies against them. First, we define
the setting, then we present results of Bayes-Pepper against
stochastic opponents and finally, we present results in se-
quential interactions against switching opponents.
5.1 Setting
Figure 2 depicts a graphical representation of the stochas-
tic game used in the experiments. There are two players,
rA
A
RA
O
Figure 2: A stochastic games with two players, the
learning agent (A) and one opponent (O). The learn-
ing agent receives a reward when it reaches state
marked with rA or RA with ra < RA. In case of col-
lision the opponent has priority over the state.
the learning agent (A) and the opponent (O). The starting
positions are marked with their initial. The learning agent
receives a reward when it reaches a goal state rA or RA, with
ra < RA. The agents can move upwards or horizontally, and
the opponent has the possibility to stay in the same state;
the learning agent moves always to the right and the oppo-
nent to the left; to avoid agents getting trapped the grid is
a toroidal world. With every step that does not transition
to a goal state the learning agent receives a penalty pmin.
In case of collision the learning agent receives high penalty
pmax with pmin < pmax.
Note that the opponent directly influences the possible
reward the learning agent can obtain. For example, since
the opponent is closer to RA it can block its way to the
learning agent, in which case the best option would be to go
for rA.
For the experiments we set rA = 5, RA = 17, pmin =
−1, pmax = −5. We test against two types of stochastic
opponents:
• A defecting opponent, OppD, that aims to block the
way to RA. It stays in the blocking position with prob-
ability 0.8.
• A cooperative opponent, OppC , that ignores the learn-
ing agent’s actions and moves upwards with probabil-
ity 0.2, and left otherwise.
The optimal policy against OppD is to go directly to rA
obtaining an accumulated reward of 3. In contrast, when
facing OppC the agent should go for RA obtaining an accu-
mulated reward of 14.
5.2 Opponent detection
In this experiment we evaluated how quickly Bayes-Pepper
responds without knowing the opponent’s identity in com-
parison with the learning process of Pepper. In this case,
Bayes-Pepper starts with the policies against OppC and
OppD and with a uniform prior over them.
Figure 3 depicts the average episodic rewards against the
two types obtained over 10 independent trials facing the
same type during the interaction. From the results we ob-
serve that Bayes-Pepper obtains higher rewards from the
beginning of the interaction due to its fast detection. In
contrast, Pepper takes more episodes to learn the appropri-
ate policy. Table 1 shows average rewards where it can be
seen that Bayes-Pepper obtained similar rewards to those of
the the Omniscient agent.
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Figure 3: Comparison of Bayes-Pepper and Pep-
per against two stochastic opponents in a repeated
SG for 150 episodes. Bayes-Pepper obtains rewards
close to the best response faster than Pepper.
Table 1: Comparison of average rewards with std.
dev. (±) obtained in 10 trials.
Bayes-Pepper Pepper Omniscient
OppC 11.19 ±5.30 8.26± 8.80 12.40± 2.30
OppD 2.87 ±4.05 0.87± 8.87 3.02± 2.97
Switching 5.44 ±6.74 2.33± 8.01 8.48± 5.21
5.3 Switching opponents
Now, we compare against switching opponents in sequen-
tial interactions, this is, during a repeated interaction of
150 games where the opponent changes frequently and the
learning agent does not know when the switches happen.
To model switching opponents an opponent is selected ran-
domly and is paired with the learning agent for a random
number of games (uniformly from 5 to 10 repetitions).
Figure 4 depicts the average (a) episodic and (b) cumula-
tive rewards of the compared approaches, and Table 1 shows
the average episodic rewards for the 150 games. From the
results we note that Bayes-Pepper obtained higher cumu-
lative rewards than Pepper. This happens because Bayes-
Pepper knows how to act optimally against every opponent,
however, it needs to identify it. In contrast, Pepper learns
how to optimize against the mixed behaviour of the two
types. Note that in many cases when an opponent changed
Bayes-Pepper was capable of obtaining competitive scores,
this happens mainly due to the intra-game detection, since
it triggers a change to a different policy when the transitions
are not consistent with the learned model. In contrast, even
when Pepper is learning within stochastic games and is able
to update its policy it obtains suboptimal results, because
it fails to obtain the reward RA against the cooperative op-
ponent.
We note that the comparison of Bayes-Pepper against
Table 2: Average rewards with std. dev. (±) for the
compared approaches against switching opponents
(average of 10 trials).
Bayes-Pepper piPepperC pi
Pepper
D pi
Pepper
CD
5.44 ± 6.74 0.46 ± 18.01 2.38 ± 4.21 3.02 ± 2.75
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Figure 4: Bayes-Pepper, Pepper and the Omniscient
agent against switching opponents in a repeated in-
teraction of 150 episodes. Average (a) episodic and
(b) cumulative rewards. (c) Cumulative rewards of
Bayes-Pepper and policies learned with Pepper.
Pepper might not be fair since Bayes-Pepper has already
policies to start. With this in mind, we also evaluated three
baselines using policies learned by Pepper against switch-
ing opponents: the policies learned against a single types
piPepperC , pi
Pepper
D and one policy learned after facing the two
opponents sequentially piPepperCD , in this case there is no learn-
ing during the interaction.
Table 2 shows average rewards over the 150 games and
Figure 4 (c) depicts cumulative rewards of the compared
approaches against the same switching opponents. Results
show that Bayes-Pepper obtains better scores than the rest.
On the one side piPepperD is a cautious policy which never
takes advantage of a cooperative opponent, on the other side
piPepperC quickly obtains the best scores against a cooperative
opponent but also gets highly penalized against a defecting
opponent. piPepperCD obtains better scores than the previous
two but is not as good as Bayes-Pepper.
6. DISCUSSION
We presented experiments with Bayes-Pepper against switch-
ing opponents in repeated stochastic games. The results sug-
gests that our approach is capable of detecting the opponent
type and act with the corresponding policy. Bayes-Pepper’s
main advantage is its quick detection in the online phase.
However, its main limitation is the offline learning phase to
obtain acting policies and models. To overcome this limita-
tion we foresee different directions in which this work could
be extended:
• State abstraction. CQ-learning has been used to re-
duce the state space representation in multi-agent sys-
tems by allowing a minimal state space representation
and only expanding for conflicting states [19]. This
same idea could be extended to our setting by having
general policies and only update partial policies for
some dangerous states.
• Lifelong learning [11] is another paradigm related to
TL where information obtained from other sources should
increase the performance on the target tasks and on
the previous source tasks (reverse transfer). Currently,
the offline learning phase is independent from the on-
line detection phase, however, it would be interesting
to use the information obtained in the online phase to
update the policies and models learned in the offline
phase.
• Multi-armed bandits [2] are a common formalism for
selecting among different actions and this approach has
been extended to select among experts [16]. Contex-
tual multi-armed bandits are an extension in which the
player also observes context information which can be
used to determine the selection process [26]. How to
incorporate contextual information in our setting is an-
other idea for future work.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Many learning algorithms for multiagent systems assume
self-play or stationary opponents. We focus on the scenario
of repeated stochastic games but with the difference of as-
suming a population of opponents and a stochastic process
that at every game matches the learning agent with an op-
ponent. Our first contribution is to provide a formal model
of the mentioned setting, namely, sequential interactions.
Our second contribution is an algorithm for quick detection
of opponents in repeated stochastic games. Our proposed
Bayes-Pepper algorithm draws inspiration from multiagent
learning algorithms and policy reuse approaches to detect
opponents. One advantage is that Bayes-Pepper is capable
of detecting the opponent and responding with the appro-
priate policy faster than learning algorithms for repeated
stochastic games. The main limitation is the need of an of-
fline learning phase where the policies and models can be
obtained. As future work we propose to not only reuse poli-
cies but also transfer information from models and policies
when facing unknown opponents, and eventually learning
the set of opponent strategies in the population online.
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